Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 5 · 2014

HANGING UP TOO EARLY: REMEDIES TO
REDUCE ROBOCALLS
Maria G. Hibbard1
INTRODUCTION
Despite the prevalence of the National Do Not Call Registry,
telemarketing still plagues millions of Americans. “Rachel” from
“Cardholder Services” has a constant presence in American homes.
Inevitably, “Rachel,” a theoretical representative from “Cardholder
Services”2 or a “government agency,” will call families with a prerecorded
telemarketing message just as a family is sitting down to dinner. Some
consumers attempt to report these “robocalls,”3 but the callers are
persistent. Even if a phone number is on the Do Not Call Registry, Rachel
and Ann keep calling back, night after night.4 Because “Cardholder
Services” or another similar company has spoofed, or faked, the number,
the calls are hard to trace and even harder to stop. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Chairman Jon Leibowitz claimed, “[a]t the FTC,
Rachel from Cardholder Services is public enemy number one.”5 Although
1.

J.D. Candidate 2014, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would
like to thank Professor Erik Jensen for his guidance regarding this Note and my
family and friends for their constant love and support.

2.

The “Rachel” from “Cardholder Services” scam was settled in July 2013 after the
FTC introduced five complaints against the companies associated with the scam
in November 2012. It is used for illustration purposes throughout this Note
because it is representative of many other similar telemarketing scams. See Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settles ‘Rachel’ Robocall Enforcement Case
(July 12, 2013).

3.

“Telemarketing calls” and “robocalls” are used interchangeably throughout this
Note. Telemarketing calls are referenced in a number of different ways in the
media, including “robocall, “spam call,” “telemarketers” or “automated calls.”
“Robocall” is the shorthand name for telemarketing calls that is most relevant to
this
Note.
See
Robocalls,
FED.
TRADE
COMM’N,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/robocalls/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). The
Federal Trade Commission also used “robocall” throughout its Summit on
October 18, 2012 discussing the problem.

4.

See, e.g., Alina Tugend, Resilience of Robocalls Leaves a Lot of Ears Ringing,
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/yourmoney/telemarketing-calls-keep-mounting-up-along-with-consumerirritation.html?_r=0 (describing the failed attempts of consumers to stop the
constant robocalls); Christina Chaey, The FTC Continues Its Crackdown on
Robocall
Scams,
FAST
C O.
(Nov.
2,
2012),
http://www.fastcompany.com/3002644/ftc-continues-its-crackdown-robocall
scams (describing the annoying nature of constant robocalls).

5.

Chaey, supra note 4.
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the individual calls themselves may be minor intrusions, the consistency
and frequency of the calls frustrates many consumers nationwide.6 The
robocalls drive some recipients to extreme behaviors, including asking for
the automated caller’s home phone number, putting the call on speaker
phone and screaming into the phone, and blowing a whistle into the phone.7
One states, “[t]hose Rachel calls . . . I would like to murder that person.”8
Another recipient of robocalls claimed, “I was getting more calls from
robots than people.”9
Although the FTC’s Do Not Call Registry, the national list of
consumers who do not wish to receive telemarketing calls,10 has
“significantly reduced the number of unwanted telemarketing calls . . .
from legitimate marketers who honor the system and recognize the
importance of respecting consumer choice,”11 illegitimate companies and
telemarketers with fraudulent intent continue to abuse the market with
growing frequency.12 From January through June 2012, over 1.2 million
fraudulent robocalls were reported—a 29% increase from the same period
in 2011.13 Despite telemarketing regulations prohibiting such calls, there is
“an increase in calls from fraudsters who are apparently willing to both
violate the laws against robocalls and ignore the Do Not Call Registry.”14
As the Do Not Call Registry reaches its tenth birthday, another serious
assessment of telemarketing regulation is warranted. Although the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act originally gave the FCC authority to
create a national do-not-call list, a national list was not created until 2003,
when the Do Not Call Implementation Act gave the FTC authority to create

6.

Tugend, supra note 4 (detailing consumer behaviors as a result of robocalls).

7.

Id. (describing the unorthodox methods consumers employ to combat robocalls).

8.

Id.

9.

Adrianne Jeffries, Who Can Stop Robocalls? FTC Tries to Crowdsource a
Solution
but
Falls
Flat,
THE
VERGE
(Jan.
28,
2013),
http://www.theverge.com/2013/1/28/3924544/who-can-stop-robocalls-ftcsattempt-to-crowdsource-a-solution-falls.

10.

See NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY, https://donotcall.gov (last visited Mar.
16, 2013) (allowing phone number registration and providing a mechanism for
filing complaints.

11.

Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Introductory Remarks at
Robocalls: All The Rage Summit (Oct. 18, 2012).

12.

This Note focuses on commercial robocalling. Issues related to robocalling from
political candidates, most frequent during election seasons, are beyond the scope
of this Note.

13.

Vijay Balasubramaniyan, Caller ID Spoofing and Caller Authentication (Oct. 18,
2012), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/robocallsall-rage-ftc-summit/robocalls-part5-caller-id-spoofing.pdf.

14.

Kati Daffan, Answering Your Questions About Robocalls, U.S. GOVERNMENT
BLOG (Aug. 28, 2012), blog.usa.gov/post/3039077932/answering-your-questionsabout-robocalls.
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and enforce such a list. With authority divided between the FCC and
FTC, both agencies constantly revised their respective telemarketing
regulations throughout the 2000s in an attempt to reach regulatory
consistency.16 However, constant revisions and inconsistent standards have
left consumers frustrated, telemarketers confused, and efforts to enforce
fraudulent telemarketing delayed.17 The regulatory authority of both
agencies–and the First Amendment issues associated with regulating
commercial speech–has been challenged in court throughout the last
decade.18 Any valuable analysis of telemarketing regulation must weigh the
interests of the government, the free speech of the telemarketer, and the
individual consumer’s right to be free from unwanted intrusions in the
home.
In particular, an evaluation of the legal and technical solutions
available to consumers is needed regarding the influx of telemarketing calls
made in the form of automated, pre-recorded voice messages. These
messages, already illegal, are often the hardest to track and prevent as they
are routed through faked numbers and blocked locations.19 The FTC
acknowledged the exigency of the issue when it announced a nationwide
“Robocall Challenge” in late 2012, encouraging individuals and small
businesses to develop a technical solution to reduce robocalling for a cash
prize of $50,000.20 While this contest was widely heralded in the media as
innovative21 and brought robocalling into the public eye, this Note
advocates that the technical solution developed for the purpose of the
15.

See infra text accompanying note 91 (describing the collaborative effort by the
FTC and FCC to create the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act in 2003).

16.

See infra text accompanying note 89 (“while a period of relative rulemaking calm
followed the promulgation of the TSR, both the FTC and the FCC began
rulemaking revisions to regulate telemarketing at a rapid pace in the early
2000’s).

17.

See Tugend, supra note 4. Julianne Pepitone, FCC Cracks Down On Cell Phone
Robocalls,
CNN
MONEY
(Mar.
15,
2013),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/15/technology/mobile/fccrobocalls/?source=cnn_bin (referencing the “FCC’s enforcement efforts and
contest to find the best solution for robocalls.” This information is incorrect. The
FTC coordinates enforcement efforts and initiated the Robocall Challenge. This
article, published on a national news media site, is only one example of
misinformation provided to consumers about robocalls).

18.

See infra Part III (detailing the judicial history of challenges to the FTC and
FCC’s regulatory authority).

19.

See infra text accompanying notes 32-33 (describing the methods Robocallers use
to make it difficult to trace their calls).

20.

See Press Release, FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Challenges Innovators to Do Battle
with Robocallers (Oct. 18, 2012).

21.

See Tod Sperry, Feds Offer $50,000 Prize For New Plan To Block Robocalls,
CNN
(Oct.
18,
2012),
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/18/us/robocallcontest/index.html (outlining the FTC robocall challenge). See also Chaey, supra
note 4 (outlining the FTC effort to crackdown on Robocalls).
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contest is only part of the solution.22 Part I of this Note will address the
technologies and processes associated with robocalling and the impact
these technologies have on the rise of robocalls. Part II will analyze the
current statutory and regulatory structure that addresses robocalling and the
detrimental effect of inconsistent regulation. Part III will consider these
regulations—and a potential ban on robocalling – in light of First
Amendment considerations. Part IV will weigh the pros and cons of a
sampling of proposed solutions to reduce robocalls. Finally, Part V will
address potential legal, technical, and practical remedies to reduce
robocalls.

I.

CURRENT ROBOCALL TECHNOLOGIES ARE QUICKLY
OUTPACING THE LAW

Unlike traditional “live” telemarketing, robocalls allow companies to
reach thousands of potential consumers in a short period of time. Formally
defined as “a telephone call from an automated source that delivers a
prerecorded message to a large number of people,”23 a robocall can include
an entirely prerecorded message, offer a prerecorded message after a
consumer responds in some way, or offer a prerecorded message before
transferring the call to a live operator. This flexibility allows companies to
easily and cheaply record a message offering a specific product or service,
send out hundreds of calls at the same time, and monitor which calls may
lead to possible business.24
While traditional marketing “cold calls” involve one live telemarketer
and one consumer, a robocalling scheme usually involves at least three
players. A marketing company or agent first obtains a list of phone
numbers before sending it to a “qualifier.”25 This “qualifier,” or lead
generator, is either a person or a machine, and pares down the list of phone
numbers that are sent to a predictive dialer.26 After a consumer answers the
phone or responds to the call, the call may be transferred to a live

22.

Challenge
Dates,
FTC
ROBOCALL
CHALLENGE,
http://robocall.challenge.gov/details/dates (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).

23.

Robocall,
MERRIAM
WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/robocall (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (stating that the first
known use of the word was in 1993).

24.

See Alicia Hatfield, Note, Phoney Business: Successful Caller ID Spoofing
Regulation Requires More than the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 19 J.L. &
POL’Y 827, 840 (2010). See also Henning Schulzrinne, Chief Tech. Officer, Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n, The Network Presentation at Robocalls All The Rage: An
FTC Summit (Oct. 18, 2012) (arguing that an attractive feature of robocalling is
its cheap transport costs).

25.

These numbers could be numbers from its own marketing activities, numbers
purchased from the Do Not Call Registry, or numbers of specific groups of
individuals, such as seniors or people with financial difficulties.

26.

See Schulzrinne, supra note 24.
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telemarketing agent. Then, the agent may try to complete a sale or ask for
a consumer’s information,28 tagging the number as one that is more likely
to respond.29 “By the time the call reaches a live human agent . . . you
already have somebody. . . [who is] willing to at least listen to the pitch.”30
By remaining on the line, pressing a button, or responding to the call in
some other way, the consumer essentially marks his or her phone number
as receptive to future marketing calls.31 Many telemarketers capitalize on
the counterintuitive nature of this process: “if you press whatever button
they offer to actually get out of it, what it means really is you’ve just
qualified yourself even more so for the next call.”32
While the many steps in this process may disguise a robocall as a
complicated endeavor, the automated nature of the calls allows each step to
be located in a different place from the rest of the system.33 Because the
qualifier may be in one city while the agent is in another, robocalls are
necessarily harder to track; phone companies sell the predictive dialers,
caller identification blockers, and other equipment that allow telemarketers
to make calls without being traced.34 Even if the same number calls the
same consumer more than once, existing technology makes it difficult for
the consumer to report the fraudulent number.
Because a phone number is not tied to a specific landline,35 a number
may be faked or “spoofed” to display an incorrect phone number on a
consumer’s caller ID.36 Although caller identification technologies have

27.

Id.

28.

Hatfield, supra note 24, at 830-31.

29.

This technique leads to the same numbers; often the least receptive consumers,
repeatedly receiving the most robocalls from the same numbers.

30.

Schulzrinne, supra note 24.

31.

This philosophy is exactly the opposite of the perspective taken by the consumers
referenced in this Note’s introduction; by responding to the robocall or remaining
on the line, consumers are more likely to receive additional phone calls from the
same marketing companies. Id. (noting that individuals are “at least willing to
listen to the pitch.”).

32.

Id.

33.

Id. (nothing that a call can be routed someplace completely different).

34.

See Telemarketing and The Telephone Consumer Protection Act, ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION PRIVACY CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/telemarketing/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2014) (Predictive dialers, as described by Ameritech Predictive
Dialers, allow companies to “place calls specified by your computer database,
screen non-productive calls such as busy signals, answering machines and no
answers, and connect your agents with live respondents.” Another service, Quest
Residential “New Telephone Hookups” Marketing List, “provides detailed
information about new residents within 24 hours of their arrival so you can reach
them first.”).

35.

In VoIP software, the phone call is made through an internet connection.

36.

Hatfield, supra note 24, at 836.
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previously helped consumers screen some unwanted sales calls,37
technologies that block numbers or insert a fraudulent number prevent
caller identification from successfully eliminating robocalls. While a
consumer may think that a telephone number originates from his or her
home area code – increasing the likelihood some consumers would answer
the unknown number – any attempt to return the call will result in an error
message.38 If the marketing company has obtained a specific list of
numbers, it may attempt to imitate a well-known or trustworthy number to
the consumer, such as the Social Security Administration, a doctor,39 or
placing a call “on behalf of the police or homeowners’ association.”40
Robocalls are increasingly more efficient and harder to track as a result of
this process as this false or misleading information masks the caller’s true
identity or the calls’ origin.41 In fact, “although technology has improved to
assist consumers in blocking unwanted calls, it has also evolved in such a
way as to assist telemarketers in making greater numbers of calls and even
circumventing such blocking technologies.”42 As a result, “it is impossible
to trace spoofed calls except by subpoenaing the spoofing company’s
records to determine the identity of the customer.”43 Text-based spoofing,
or SMS spoofing, is accomplished through the same process; although the
information is within a text that can be stored in a cell phone, the text
contains information that is impossible to trace.44
Telemarketers can make these calls cheaply and quickly thanks to
Voice-Over-IP (VoIP) or internet-based calling software such as Skype and
Google Voice. VoIP reduces geographic restrictions and removes the
expense associated with landlines.45 VoIP-originated calls are now the most
37.

Vanessa Miller, Robocalls Complicate Do-Not-Call Rules in Iowa, THE
GAZETTE (Jan. 23, 2013, 6:30AM), thegazette.com/2013/01/23/robocallscomplicate-do-not-call-rules-in-iowa/ (“Johnson said caller identification has
been a great way to screen out unwanted sales calls in the past . . .”).

38.

Id.

39.

See Schulzrinne, supra note 24 (noting that a company may use the numbers of an
“entity where the call person is more likely to both pick up the phone and believe,
at least initially, the sales pitch.”).

40.

Better Business Bureau of Southern Arizona, Consumers’ Phones Being Flooded
with
Illegal
‘Robocalls,’
TUSCON
CITZEN
(Jan.
15,
2013),
tusconctizen.com/bbbconsumeralert/2013/15/consumers-phones-being-floodedwith-illegal-robocalls.

41.

Schulzrinne, supra note 24. Hatfield, supra note 24, at 831-32.

42.

FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 02-278, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
1991, at 30 (Feb. 15, 2012).

43.

See Hatfield, supra note 24, at 831.

44.

See id. at 832-33 (explaining how text message spoofing is accomplished and
why this technique is difficult to trace).

45.

See Vijay Balasubramaniyan, The Network Presentation at Robocalls All The
Rage: An FTC Summit (Oct. 18, 2012) (“The reason they are using Voice over
IP . . . is [it] allows you to be anonymous, . . . [it is] largely automatic, and it’s
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common type of robocalls, representing 46% of all reported robocalls.46
Ultimately, “with the combination of [VoIP] calls, cloud computing, auto
dialing software, and other advances, it is now possible to make robocalls
for one cent per call or less.”47 Because of the cheap methods for
transporting information, the easy access to blocking equipment and
software, and the minimal live labor required, robocalling is an ideal tool
for companies looking to reach the maximum number of consumers at
minimal cost.48 As robocalling technology continues to advance,
telemarketing statutory and regulatory structure must progress as well.

II. CURRENT TELEMARKETING REGULATORY AND STATUTORY
STRUCTURE: HANGING UP TOO EARLY
A.

The Telemarketing Consumer Protection Act of 1991 Introduces
Federal Telemarketing Regulation

Before The Telemarketing Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA),
a patchwork of state laws regulated telemarketing with varying levels of
severity and enforcement.49 Although some state statutes and do-not-call
lists were both effective means of reducing telemarketing calls, others were
“so riddled with exceptions that the law had been rendered ‘practically
unenforceable.’”50 The TCPA does not preempt state law,51 but it
introduced broad federal telemarketing regulation authorizing the FCC to
enact rules to regulate telemarketing in greater detail.52 TCPA was
extremely inexpensive.” Further explains that Voice over IP allows users to select
the geographic area they want to call.”).
46.

See id. (presenting a chart outlining the most frequent methods of robocalling).

47.

Daffan, supra note 14.

48.

See Schulzrinne, supra note 24 (“[W]e have three key components that make
robocalling particularly attractive now and increasingly so; normally with cheap
transport in switching, the ability to spoof numbers, and because of the ability to
move internationally, to use cheap labor where labor is necessary . . . . Those
three things are what make robocalling much more scalable then the old boiler
room ever was.”).

49.

See Jason C. Miller, Note, Regulating Robocalls: Are Automated Calls the Sound
of, or a Threat to, Democracy? 16 MICH. TELECOM. TECH. L. REV. 213, 231-32
(2009) (“[M]ost states that do have regulations rarely enforce them, further
adding to the confusion.”).

50.

Douglas C. Nelson, Note, The Do-Not-Call Implementation Act: Legislating the
Sound of Silence, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 63, 66 (2003) (quoting Michael E.
Shannon, Combatting Unsolicited Sales Calls: The “Do-Not-Call” Approach to
Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIS. 381, 411 (2001)).

51.

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006)
(permitting party to bring claim in state court).

52.

Id. § 227(c) (“Within 120 days after December 20, 2001, the Commission shall
initiate a rulemaking proceeding concerning the need to protect residential
telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to
which they object.”).
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necessary because telemarketers’ were “avoid[ing] the restrictions of State
law, simply by locating their phone centers out of state. Congress thus
sought to put the TCPA on the same footing as state law, essentially
supplementing state law where there were perceived jurisdictional gaps.”53
TCPA specifically forbids calls “using an artificial or prerecorded voice to
deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party.”54
The statute also forbids the use of predictive dialers to make commercial
telemarketing calls. TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system”
as “equipment which has the capacity A) to store or produce telephone
numbers to be called, using a random sequential number generator; and B)
to dial such numbers.”55 Automated calls to cell phones are also
specifically forbidden,56 but the legality of VoIP calls and text messages are
not addressed.57 Although this prohibition seems rather broad, the TCPA
exempts robocalls made for necessary mass communications such as
weather emergencies, flight cancellations, and other calls that are not
explicitly commercial.58
53.

Yuri R. Linetsky, Protection of “Innocent Lawbreakers:” Striking the Right
Balance in the Private Enforcement of the Anti “Junk Fax” Provisions of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 90 NEB L. REV. 70, 77 (2011) (quoting
Bonime v. Avaya Inc., No. 06 CV 1630(CBA), 2006 E.D.N.Y. WL 3751219, at
*5).

54.

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any person within the
United States . . . to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line
using an artificial or pre-recorded voice to deliver a message without the prior
consent of the called party . . .”).

55.

Id. § 227(a) (defining “automatic telephone dialing system”).

56.

Id. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (forbidding automated calls made to cellular telephone
services, or “any service for which the called party is charged for the call”). This
provision may not be currently relevant, to pre-paid cell phone plans and
unlimited minutes – unlike in older cell phone plans or landlines, consumers may
not be specifically charged for each call.

57.

FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 92-90, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
1991 (Sept. 17, 1992) (providing information on how developing technology
might soon require the Commission to revise its rules “in order to more
effectively carryout Congress’s directives in the TCPA”). VoIP and text message
technology was not prevalent at the time of the enactment of the TCPA; the Act
has not been revised since that time to include such technology.

58.

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(B) (2006) (listing specific prerecorded calls that are
exempt from the statute). See also Robocalls, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2012),
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0259-robocalls (listing specific calls that
are exempt from telemarketing regulation in general); 47 § 227 (b)(2)(B)(ii)(I-II)
(2006) (advising that the FCC may proscribe rules that exempt categories of calls
made for commercial purposes that “will not adversely affect the privacy rights
that this section is intended to protect; and II) do not include the transmission of
any unsolicited advertisement”). The definition of what is not ‘explicitly
commercial’ is still debated—while telemarketers may argue that a call providing
‘information’ about a product is not explicitly commercial, it most often delivers
an additional message asking a consumer to purchase something or offer credit
card information in exchange for some ‘free’ product or service.
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The TCPA mandates the FCC to “consider prescribing regulations to
allow businesses to avoid receiving calls made using an artificial or
prerecorded voice to which they have not given their prior express
consent.”59 It also specifically authorizes the FCC to create exempt from
regulation calls that are not made for a commercial purpose, calls that “will
not adversely affect the privacy rights that this section is intended to
protect,” and calls that do not include the transmission of unsolicited
advertisement.60 Consumers with “an established business relationship”61
with a company may receive telemarketing calls from that company.
Finally, the TCPA gives the FCC authority to establish a single national
do-not-call database62 if it should find that it is an “effective and efficient”63
remedy to accomplish the purposes of the act. Although a long road of
rulemaking and revisions was ahead, Congress took the first step in
creating uniform national telemarketing policy with the passage of federal
telemarketing legislation.

59.

Id. § 227(b)(2)(A). See also supra Part (II)(V) (noting that although the 1991 act
gives the FCC this power, the FCC did not enact similar regulations to this end
until early 2012—nearly 19 years later).

60.

Id. § 227(B)(2)(A-B) (listing the exceptions from the statute).

61.

Id. § 227(b)(2)(G) (giving free reign to the Commission to determine the details
of this ‘established business relationship;’ the Act lists a number of factors for the
Commission to consider, including considering the number of complaints the
Commission has received, the benefits of establishing such a relationship, and the
possible costs of such a limitation on small businesses). See also 47 C.F.R. §
64.1200(f)(5) (2013) (defining an ‘established business relationship’ as “a prior or
existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication between a
person or entity and a residential subscriber with or without an exchange of
consideration, on the basis of the subscriber’s purchase or transaction with the
entity within the eighteen months immediately preceding the date of the telephone
call or on the basis of the subscriber’s inquiry or application regarding products or
services offered by the entity within the three months immediately preceding the
date of the call, which relationship has not been previously terminated by the
party.”).

62.

47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3) (2006) (granting the FCC authority to establish “a single
national database to compile a list of telephone numbers of residential subscribers
who object to receiving telephone solicitations, and to make that compiled list and
parts thereof available for purchase.”).

63.

Id. § 227(c)(1)(E) (“Within 120 days after December 20, 1991, the Commission
shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding concerning the need to protect residential
telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to
which they object. The proceeding shall . . . develop proposed regulations to
implement the methods and procedures that the Commission determines are most
effective and efficient to accomplish the purposes of this section.”).
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B.

The FCC’s Initial Telemarketing Rules of 1992: Minimal
Rulemaking Following National Legislation

After the passage of the TCPA, the FCC promulgated its first set of
telemarketing rules in 1992.64 Although the TCPA gave the FCC power to
establish a national do-not-call registry,65 the FCC instead required
businesses to begin to maintain business-specific do-not-call lists that
honored consumer requests to be excluded from calls from an individual
company for ten years from the date of the request.66 Among other
restrictions, these rules also require identification of “the individual, or
other entity, that is responsible for initiating the call, and include a contact
phone number”67 at the beginning of the call, restrict calling hours to after 8
a.m. or before 9 p.m., and require telemarketers to initiate adequate training
processes for employees to comply with these restrictions.68 These
business-specific do-not-call lists fulfilled the requirements of the TCPA
but added to consumer confusion. Throughout the 1990s, consumers could
add their phone numbers to multiple company do-not-call lists and multiple
state do-not-call lists (if they existed), but continued to receive fraudulent
pre-recorded marketing calls.69

C.

The Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act:
Preventing Fraud, But Adding Confusion

Only three years after the TCPA was passed, Congress by passing the
Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (TCFAPA) in
1994.70 Another congressional act became necessary since “interstate
telemarketing fraud has become a problem of such magnitude”71 that
“consumers . . . are estimated to lose $40 billion a year in telemarketing
fraud,”72 and “consumers are victimized by other forms of telemarketing
64.

FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 92-90, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
1991 (Sept. 18, 2002) (“In 1992, the Commission adopted rules implementing the
TCPA, including the requirement that entities making telephone solicitations
institute procedures for maintaining do-not-call lists.”).

65.

47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3) (2006) (giving the FCC authority to establish “a single
national database”).

66.

FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 92-90, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
1991, at 40-41 (Sept. 17, 1992).

67.

Miller, supra note 49, at 226; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(b)(1)-(2) (2013).

68.

FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 92-90, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
1991 (Sept. 17, 1992); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(1) (2013).

69.

See supra Part (II).

70.

Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61016108 (2006).

71.

Id. § 6101(2) (stating the purposes of the act).

72.

Id. § 6101(3).
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deception and abuse.” While the TCPA delegated authority to the FCC,
the TCFAPA empowered the FTC to proscribe rules “prohibiting deceptive
telemarketing acts.”74 Both the TCPA and include similar requirements for
FTC rulemaking. However, the TCFAPA also prohibits “calls which the
reasonable consumer would consider coercive or abusive of such
consumer’s right to privacy,”75 restrictions on the hours of the day when
calls can be made,76 and prompt disclosure of the telemarketer and the
purpose of the call.77 Violations of any of these guidelines could qualify as
“abusive” telemarketing; abusive telemarketing can constitute any call
made to a consumer who has previously stated that he or she does not wish
to receive a call.78
Although it also does not preempt state law, the TCFAPA does not
address its interaction with the TCPA or any existing FCC rules; the rest of
the act deals only with Securities and Exchange Commission rules and
addresses state and private rights of action.79 While the title of the
TCFAPA implies an added emphasis on telephone fraud, it does no more to
address fraudulent telemarketing practices besides giving another federal
agency rulemaking power. Under the TCFAPA, the FTC was given a year
to enact appropriate rules.80 With both federal and state telemarketing
statutes, FCC rules, and forthcoming FTC rules, the maze of telemarketing
regulation continued to grow.

D.

Telemarketing Sales Rule: The FTC Joins Telemarketing
Rulemaking

Following the passage of the TCFAPA, the FTC also promulgated its
own telemarketing rules, called the “Telemarketing Sales Rule” (TSR), in
1995.81 Defined relatively narrowly, telemarketing is described in the rule
as “a plan, program, or campaign which is conducted to induce the
purchase of goods or services or a charitable contribution, by use of one or
73.

Id. § 6101(4).

74.

Id. § 6103(a)(1). See also 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006) (granting the FCC authority to
make telemarketing rules).

75.

15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(3)(A)(2006).

76.

Id. § 6102(a)(3)(B).

77.

Id. § 6102(a)(3)(C).

78.

See Angie A. Welborn, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31642, REGULATION OF THE
TELEMARKETING INDUSTRY: STATE AND NATIONAL DO NOT-CALL REGISTRIES 2
(July 8, 2003) (describing abusive telemarketing practices).

79.

15 U.S.C. §§ 6107-6110 (2006).

80.

Id. § 6103(b).

81.

16 C.F.R. § 310.1- 310.9 (2010) See ELECTRONIC INFORMATION PRIVACY CENTER,
supra note 34 (stating that “it is important to note that the TSR does not apply to
certain forms of telemarketing, including most business-to-business sales calls,
telemarketing by banks, federal financial institutions, common carriers (phone
companies and airlines), insurance companies, and non-profit organizations”).
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more telephones and which involves more than one interstate telephone
call.”82 As required by the 1994 act – and just like TCPA and the
subsequent FCC rules – the TSR states that valid information about the
identity of the caller, the caller’s affiliation with any company, and the
purpose of the call must be disclosed at the beginning of the call.83 Among
other prohibitions and guidelines, telemarketers are also required to keep
extensive records of all calls, employees who make telemarketing calls, and
any fake names used to maintain compliance with the law.84 The TSR also
forbids “abandoned calls,” which occurs when a consumer answers a phone
call and the telemarketer does not connect the call to a live sales
representative within two seconds of the greeting.85 Just as with the FCC
regulations, certain exceptions apply. For instance, telemarketers can still
call people from whom they have obtained an express agreement to call
that person, and they can also call people with whom they have an
established business relationship.86
The TSR also includes a type of “safe harbor” provision whereby a
company can shield itself from liability by establishing and implementing
written compliance procedures, training its employees under these
procedures, and maintaining a list of persons who may not be called due to
their request.87 Other than the additional prohibition of abusive
telemarketing acts (such as threats or intimidation),88 the TSR closely
mirrors the TCPA and the subsequent FCC rules. With so much similarity
between the TSR, the TCPA, and FCC rules, it was not until a number of
revisions by both the FTC and the FCC that the purpose of this dual
regulatory and enforcement process became clear.

E.

A Flurry of Revisions: FTC and FCC Telemarketing Rule Changes
Play Catch-Up.

While a period of relative rule-making calm followed the promulgation
of the TSR, both the FTC and the FCC rapidly made rulemaking revisions
to regulate telemarketing in the early 2000s.89 Although the FCC and the
FTC both had the authority to establish a do-not-call registry since 1991
82.

16 C.F.R. § 310.2(dd) (2010).

83.

Id. § 310.1-310.9.

84.

Id. § 310.4(b).

85.

Additional Report to Congress Pursuant to the Do Not Call Registry Fee
Extension Act of 2007, FED. TRADE COMM’N 12 (2009).

86.

16 C.F.R § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(ii) (2010).

87.

Id. § 310.4(b).

88.

Id. § 310.2(dd) (noting that “threats, intimidation, or the use of profane or
obscene language constitutes abusive conduct.”).

89.

FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 18 FCC RCD. 14014, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
1991 (2003) (stating that Commission reviewed the telemarketing rules and
adopted modification and changes in the rules).
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and 1994, respectively, the 2003 revisions represented the first time the
agencies worked together to create a proactive national registry. The Do
Not Call Implementation Act, passed on March 11, 2003, implemented a
nationwide, online do-not-call list that combined the phone numbers on
existing state do-not-call lists and created an easy clearinghouse for
consumers who wanted to avoid telemarketing calls.91
Both regulatory agencies recognized that company-specific lists were
not sufficiently preventing telemarketing calls; a nationwide registry that
combined existing, smaller do-not call lists and served as a “one-stop”
solution to reduce telemarketing calls provided a more direct remedy.
Administered by the FTC, the Do Not Call Registry was widely heralded in
the media as the end of telemarketing calls and also proved popular with
the public, with over 50 million numbers entered onto the list within the
first few months.92 Because the TCPA only explicitly gave the FCC
authority to create such a list and the TCFAPA did not give the same
authority to the FTC, the FTC’s authority to enforce a do-not-call list was
initially challenged.93 Despite the dual regulatory power of the FTC and
FCC, the Do Not Call Implementation Act was a step to end
inconsistencies. The Act requires annual reports from each agency about
the progress of telemarketing regulation and enforcement,94 and mandates
that any inconsistencies be resolved administratively by the agencies, or
“Congress must address them legislatively.”95
As of October 2003, it was illegal for telemarketers to call numbers
listed on the registry.96 After the Do Not Call Implementation Act, the FTC
and the FCC both made revisions to their existing telemarketing rules to
reflect the impact of the Do Not Call Registry. The FTC’s 2002 revisions to
the TSR also made it illegal to interfere with caller ID services although
telemarketers can still use the name and number of a legitimate company.97
Telemarketers must use a version of the National Do Not Call list no more

90.

See supra Part (II).

91.

Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6110 (2003).

92.

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 85, at 2.

93.

See Welborn, supra note 78, at 6-7 (stating that after the FTC issued amendments
to the Telemarketing Sales Rule, “the Commission’s authority to promulgate
regulations imposing fees on telemarketers for use of the do not call list was at
issue.”).

94.

15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6110 (2006) (requiring that the FCC and FTC each submit a
report to the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate within 45 days after the promulgation
of a FCC final rule).

95.

Id.

96.

See Welborn, supra note 78, at 8-9 (stating that “as of October, it will be illegal
for telemarketers to call numbers listed on the registry).

97.

See Hatfield, supra note 24, at 830-31 (stating that the ANI “[i]dentifies which
telephone account to charge for incoming phone calls).

91

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 5 · 2014
Hanging Up Too Early
than 31 days old to scrub their telemarketing lists.98 The FCC’s revisions
also regulated predictive dialers, requiring that telemarketers abandon no
more than three percent of calls when using these dialing tools.99
Although the TCPA gave the FCC power to initiate rules regarding
prerecorded voice messages in 1991,100 the 2003 revisions explicitly
targeted prerecorded voice messages, recognizing that the majority of
prerecorded calls offering “free” things (in an attempt to not be regarded as
“explicitly commercial”) are “designed with the ultimate goal of soliciting
consumers to buy products and services and are therefore prohibited
without the prior express consent of the called party.”101 Like the FTC, the
FCC’s 2003 revisions also included a requirement that telemarketers
transmit correct caller identification information when available; caller ID
blocking was prohibited.102 The exemption for the “established business
relationship” was narrowed, limiting the relationship to at most eighteen
months and requiring that the “established relationship” be of such a nature
“to create an expectation on the part of the consumer that a particular
company will call them.”103 Responding to a telemarketing call in some
way (for example, by pressing a button) is not enough to establish a
“business relationship.”104 The Telemarketing Relief Act of 2003 even

98.

FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 18 FCC
Rcd. at n. 37 (2003) (“comparing a do not call list to a company’s call list and
eliminating from the call list the telephone numbers of consumers who have
registered a desire not to be called.”).

99.

Id. at 14017. Although telemarketers use predictive dialers in an attempt to
minimize the amount of downtime both callers and consumers have during a call,
the call often results in a predicate dialer greeting some callers, but not others,
leaving some calls silent.

100. Id. at 14116 (This revision may have been unnecessary and duplicative,
considering the FCC statement regarding the TCPA: “we affirm that under the
TCPA, it is unlawful to make any call using an automatic telephone dialing
system or an artificial or prerecorded message to any wireless telephone
number”). See also 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (stating that “it shall be unlawful for
any person within the United States . . . to make any call (other than a call made
for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called
party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded
voice”).
101. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 18 FCC
Rcd. at 14097 (2003).
102. Id. at 14017 (stating that “the new rules will also require all companied
conducting telemarketing to transmit caller identification (caller ID) information,
when available, and prohibits them from blocking such information.”).
103. Id. at 14081.
104. Id. (stating that “an inquiry regarding a business’s hours or location would not
establish the necessary relationship as defined in Commission rules.”).
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stated that the FCC must establish “substantially similar” regulations to the
TSR within 90 days of the act.105
It took time before both regulatory structures were “substantially
similar.” However, recognizing that “marketplace changes warrant
modifications to our existing rules,”106 the FCC did not stop revising its
telemarketing regulations with the implementation of the Do Not Call
Registry. The FCC continued to add to and revise its rules, subsequently
amending its telemarketing regulations in 2004 by amending the National
Do Not Call Registry safe harbor rules,107 in 2008 by requiring
telemarketers to honor do-not-call list registrations indefinitely,108 and 2012
by adopting five specific customer protections.109 Although the FCC wrote
in 2003, “[w]e intend to develop a Memorandum of Understanding with the
FTC in the near future outlining the respective federal responsibilities
under the national do-not-call rules,”110 the FCC and FTC’s constant
revisions throughout the 2000s are duplicative and confusing. The FTC
revised its own TSR twice in 2008 (first, banning prerecorded messages
unless written consent is given and limiting call abandonment to 3%)111 and
second (setting maximum and minimum permanent fees for access to the
registry).112 The Do Not Call Improvement Act in part initiated these
105. Telemarketing Relief Act, H.R. 526, 108th Cong. (2003) (requiring that “not later
than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the agencies identified in
subsection (b) shall issue rules that are substantially similar to the Telemarketing
Sales Rule promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission.”).
106. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 18 FCC
Rcd. at 14017 (2003).
107. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 19 FCC
Rcd. at 19215 (2004) (requiring that the existing safe harbor rules for
telemarketers be amended “to require such telemarketers to access the do-not-call
list no more than 31 days prior to making a telemarketing call”).
108. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Rules Amended to Require
Telemarketers to Honor Do-Not-Call List Registrations Indefinitely (June 17,
2008), http://www.fcc.gov/tools/headlines-archive/2008 (stating that the rules
requiring telemarketers to honor Do-Not-Call registry registrations indefinitely).
109. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Adopts Rules to Strengthen
Consumer Protections Against Unwanted Telemarketing “Robocalls” to Wireline
and
Wireless
Phones
(Feb.
15,
2012),
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-312493A1.pdf.
110. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 02-278, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
1991, at 46 (2003).
111. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Issues Final Telemarketing Sales Rule
Amendments
Regarding
Prerecorded
Calls
(Aug.
19,
2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/08/tsr.shtm).
112. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.8 (2006) (“The annual fee, which
must be paid by any person prior to obtaining access to the National Do Not Call
Registry, is $62 per area code of data accessed, up to a maximum of $17,050.”).
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changes. Signed in early 2008, the legislation focused on necessary
changes regarding the FTC’s administration of the Do Not Call list.113
While the FTC’s revisions were instigated by acts of Congress,114 the FCC
revisions seemed to occur without a discernible pattern.
Initially, some changes in the FTC and FCC regulations seemed to
serve the interests of both consumers and telemarketers; an FTC report, as
required by the Do Not Call Implementation Act, reported high
effectiveness of Do Not Call outreach focusing on seniors and immigrants,
and “consumers who have joined the registry report dramatic reductions in
unwanted marketing calls.”115 The FTC’s 2008 changes explicitly forbade
prerecorded calls; 116 however, these prerecorded calls were already
forbidden by the FCC’s 2003 revisions to its telemarketing regulations117
and the TCPA.118 Despite the FCC’s regulation of predictive dialers in
2003, the FTC’s 2009 report acknowledged that abandoned calls were still
on the rise.119
This “catch-up game” of regulations did not end in 2008. While the
FTC’s 2008 revisions required prior express written consent from a
consumer in order for a telemarketer to have permission to make a legal
call, the FCC did not make similar revisions until 2012.120 Among other
provisions, these revisions require telemarketers to obtain written consent
from the customer (even if it is only on an online form) and provide
customers with an automated method to opt out of future calls for the
company itself (even if it is at the end of the call). The FTC’s 2008
revisions had already required an interactive opt-out procedure for
consumers to add their numbers to the Do Not Call list and report the
violation using push buttons during the call.121 The 2012 FCC rules also
113. See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 6101 (West 2014) (discussing the reasoning for
Congressional action regarding the regulation of telemarketing).
114. Telemarketing Relief Act of 2003, H.R. 52, 108th Cong. (2003); Do-Not-Call
Improvement Act of 2007, H.R. 3541, 110th Cong. (2008).
115. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 85, at 1.
116. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 27 FCC
Rcd. at 1830-31 (2012) (discussing the previously enacted requirements for
prerecorded messages).
117. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 18 FCC
Rcd. at 1404 (2003).
118. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(2006).
119. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 85, at 13-14.
120. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 27 FCC
Rcd. at 1830 (2012) (implementing reactively many of the same provisions the
FTC had implemented years earlier; the regulations did not go into effect until
early 2013).
121. See Do-Not-Call Improvement Act of 2007, H.R. 3541, 110th Cong. (2008).
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eliminated the “established business relationship”122 exception that allowed
companies to call customers for 18 months after a purchase.123 While
companies may still call consumers from whom they have received express
written consent, the element of consent must be “clear and conspicuous
disclosure” where the customer agrees unambiguously to receive calls.124
The consent must be obtained in a manner that does not require the
agreement be executed as a condition of a purchase decision.125 Consent is
not necessarily difficult to obtain, however; the FTC has ruled that the Esign Act, where consent may be obtained through telephone buttons, esignatures on the internet, or other electronic means, will satisfy the
“express consent” requirement.126
Coming four years after the FTC’s most relevant changes in
telemarketing regulation, the FCC’s 2012 revisions were particularly
reactive; the FCC even wrote that it was evident that rulemaking changes
were needed due to “ongoing consumer frustration reflected in our
complaint data and the positive consumer response to the FTC’s
proceedings.”127 As with other revisions by the FTC and FCC, these were
hailed as a permanent solution to stop robocalls in the news media. One
reporter writes, “those aggravating automated telemarketing calls will be
interrupting your dinner a lot less often.”128 While the multiple revisions to
the FTC and FCC telemarketing rules certainly aim to “maximize
122. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 85, at 12 (stating that the established business
relationship exemption was often perceived as inconsistent by members of the
public, because “the consumers are unaware of these exceptions or are not aware
that they have a relationship with the seller that falls within one of these
exceptions.”).
123. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Adopts Rules to Strengthen
Consumer Protections Against Unwanted Telemarketing “Robocalls” to Wireline
and
Wireless
Phones
(Feb.
15,
2012),
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-312493A1.pdf
(“Eliminating the ‘established business relationship’ exemption to the
requirement that telemarketing robocalls to residential wireline phones occur only
with prior express consent from the consumer.”).
124. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 27 FCC
Rcd. at 1830 (2012).
125. Id. (“In addition, the written agreement must be obtained without requiring,
directly or indirectly, that the agreement be executed as a condition of purchasing
any good or service.”).
126. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 27 FCC
Rcd. at 1830 (2012); 15 U.S.C. 7006(4) (2006).
127. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 27 FCC
Rcd. at 1830 (2012).
128. Andrea Chang, New FCC Rules Curb Automated Telemarketing Calls, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012), http://articles/latimes.com/2012/feb/15/business/la-firobcalling-20120216.
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consistency,” consistency has never fully been evident in telemarketing
rulemaking.

III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH ISSUES: DOES “RACHEL” HAVE FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS?
Although inconsistent rulemaking provisions from the FTC and FCC
may distract from the purpose of telemarketing regulation, its ultimate aim
is to balance the right of the telemarketer’s freedom to make calls (as a
form of speech) against the consumer’s right to remain free from unwanted
intrusions in the home. Many consumers who hear “Rachel” on the other
end of the line may not realize the mutterings of this “robots” are protected
by the First Amendment, but the constitutionality of regulations concerning
this type of robot call has been challenged in court on this exact basis.129
Telemarketing regulations have been subject to a number of First
Amendment challenges over the years and have ultimately remained
protected as “consistent with the First Amendment rights of commercial
speakers,”130 but any analysis of potential telemarketing regulations
requires an evaluation of the interests at stake.

A.

Telemarketing as Commercial Speech in the Home

While the TCPA exempts calls that are not explicitly commercial,131
many telemarketing calls – while not an outright solicitation for a product –
are an attempt to propose a commercial transaction. Commercial speech is
defined narrowly as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial
transaction. . . [and are]. . . [r]emoved from any ‘exposition of ideas.’”132
Robocalls fit this definition. Commercial speech also encompasses
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience.”133 Robocalls that initially offer a reduction in credit card interest
rates or a review of a mortgage might not solely relate to “the economic
interests of the speaker and the audience.”134 Most robocalls aim to
motivate the listener in some economic respect – either through gaining
credit card information or defrauding the customer in some other way.135
129. See, e.g., Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 358 F.3d
1228, 1250 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that “the do-not-call list is a valid
commercial speech regulation under Central Hudson.”).
130. Id. at 1228.
131. See supra Part II(I).
132. Stephen M. Worth, Note, “Do Not Call” Laws and the First Amendment: Testing
the Limits of Commercial Free Speech Protection, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.
L. 467, 482 (2003) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978)
(anticipating legal challenges to the National Do Not Call Registry).
133. Id.
134. Supra Part I(II).
135. See INFORMATION PRIVACY CENTER, supra note 34 (discussing privacy, civil
rights, and constitutional issues regarding telemarketing).
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Determining what qualifies as commercial speech is based simply on “the
‘common-sense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction . . . and other varieties of speech.”136 Because the speaker has an
economic interest in the matter, and there are often no other purposes to the
call beyond simple advertising, most robocalls qualify as commercial
speech. 137
Commercial speech is entitled to protection of the First Amendment –
although less than non-commercial speech.138 If robocalls are defined as
“commercial speech,” they are limited by reasonable restrictions;139
however, the forum in which the commercial speech is given special
consideration. 140 Phone lines in the private home are “a device for private
communication,” and are therefore not a public forum.141 Robocalls made
to a home phone line are particularly intrusive because the recipient cannot
simply tell the caller to go away; the caller, rather than the recipient, elects
the time and manner that the message arrives.142 As much as the robocaller
may have the right to express a statement about a commercial product, a
consumer must have the right to “have peace and quiet and tranquility in
their home.”143
The Supreme Court has recognized the sanctity of the home numerous
times: “citizens in the privacy of their homes should be able to exercise a
high degree of control over the communication to which they are
subjected.”144 Likewise, “the government has an interest in upholding the

136. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (discussing first
amendment protection afforded to commercial speech). See also Zauderer v.
Office of Disc. Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (discussing protection of
advertisers’ commercial rights).
137. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp, 463 U.S. 60, 80 (1983) (ruling that
mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements is commercial speech).
138. See Zauderer v. Office of Disc. Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (discussing
protection of advertiser’s commercial rights).
139. See infra text accompanying note 151.
140. See Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1552 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding
constitutionality of Minnesota’s Automatic Dialing-Announcing Device law); see
also Miller, supra note 49, at 229 (discussing the controversial nature of
automated robotic calls and their regulation).
141. Miller, supra note 49, at 229 (2009) (discussing controversial nature of automated
robotic calls and their regulation).
142. See id. at 241 (2009) (citing Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1554-55
(8th Cir. 1995)).
143. See id. at 240 (quoting Indiana Supreme Court Justice Dixon) (discussing
possible political impact on upcoming Indiana Supreme Court ruling regarding
automated political robocalls).
144. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (ruling that a recipient of
postal mail has unreviewable discretion in deciding whether or not to receive
future content from a particular sender, and that the sender does not have a
constitutional right to mail unwanted material). See also Nelson, supra note 50
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rights of residents in their homes.”145 Because telemarketing is uniquely
intrusive and many other forms of non-direct advertising are available,
some courts have found that telemarketing should be subject to uniquely
restrictive regulation.146 Aural communication, made through the personal
home phone line, is especially intrusive because it is “extremely difficult to
ignore and therefore more intrusive than visual communication.”147 Even
though some skeptics have hesitated to call telemarketing a “serious
intrusion”148 on privacy, the federal government has justified regulation
based solely on complaints and outrage by consumers.149

B.

Under-Inclusive Regulations for an Overly Intrusive Device:
Reasonable Restrictions Held Constitutional

Although laws regulating commercial speech have consistently been
challenged, “[t]he Supreme Court has consistently upheld the
constitutionality of “underinclusive” regulations.”150 Most telemarketing
(discussing the Do-Not-Call-Implementation-Act re-allocation of power between
consumers and telemarketers).
145. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 02-278, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
1991, at 41 (June 26, 2003) (reviewing and revising the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act by establishing; in conjunction with the Federal Trade
Commission, a national do-not-call registry for customers wishing to avoid
telemarketing calls); see also Rowan v. U.S. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 737
(1970) (ruling that a recipient of postal mail has unreviewable discretion in
deciding whether or not to receive future content from a particular sender, and
that the sender does not have a constitutional right to mail unwanted material),
but see Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ruling that a law
prohibiting distribution of leaflets advertising a Jehovah’s Witness religious
meeting violates a Jehovah Witness’ First Amendment rights).
146. Telemarketing and door-to-door solicitation have been distinguished from other
forms of marketing because of the immediate attention they require. See Miller,
supra note 49, at 241 (discussing the controversial nature of automated robotic
calls and their regulation).
147. Nelson, supra note 50, at 71 (discussing the Do-Not-Call-Implementation-Act reallocation of power between consumers and telemarketers).
148. Worth, supra note 132, at 491 (writing that “it is a bit of a stretch to characterize
these interruptions as ‘serious intrusions’ since the solicitations are short and can
easily be ended by the consumer at any time by merely hanging up the phone”).
149. Robert McDowell, Statement Regarding Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-strengthens-consumer-protections-againsttelemarketing-robocalls-0) (last viewed Feb. 11, 2014) (stating “sometimes it
seems like there’s no escape. The minute you sit down at the family dinner table
or settle in to watch your favorite basketball team, the phone rings.”). See also
Mignon Clyburn, Statement Regarding Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-strengthens-consumer-protections-againsttelemarketing-robocalls-0 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (stating that the revisions
are “yet another victory for consumers”).
150. Nelson, supra note 50, at 71.
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regulations fall within this category; those short of a ban are upheld
because the regulations “only prevent dissemination to the unwilling.”151
Non-content based bans of truthful, non-misleading messages have been
upheld:152 “We have often noted that restrictions of this kind are valid
provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.”153 The government may place
reasonable time and manner restrictions on content neutral speech;154 for
example, reasonable-timing restrictions, such as the restrictions on when a
telemarketer can call, such as between 9 A.M. and 8 P.M are constitutional.
Telemarketers challenging the TCPA in the early 1990s claimed the statute
was not content neutral—saying it “regulated speech based on substance
rather than form”—but these challenges were overturned.155
However, robocalls and fraudulent telemarketing messages may not
always be truthful, and these types of calls are often harder to track.156
When evaluating any new potential regulation, the interests of the parties at

151. See id. (discussing “consumer specific restrictions on point-to-point media”);
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (ruling that a recipient of postal
mail has unreviewable discretion in deciding whether or not to receive future
content from a particular sender, and that the sender does not have a
constitutional right to mail unwanted material).
152. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993) (ruling that
a ban on distribution of commercial material through news racks is a violation of
the first amendment). See also 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502
(1996) (ruling that a complete ban on advertising alcohol prices is a violation of
the first amendment).
153. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(ruling that National Park Service regulation banning sleeping in national parks is
not a First Amendment violation, even in light of an awareness group’s permit for
a seven day protest); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding content neutral and impartially administered city law
banning signs on public land because the city’s interests were substantial enough
to justify it); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (ruling that ban on
carrying signs, banners, or devices on public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme
Court building is unconstitutional); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (ruling that a states cannot
limit pharmacists from providing information about prescription drug prices);
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993) (ruling that a
ban on distribution of commercial material through news racks is a violation of
the First Amendment).
154. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (stating that
“[e]xpression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.”).
155. See Joseph R. Cox, Telemarketing, The First Amendment, and Privacy:
Expanding Telemarketing Regulations Without Violating the Constitution, 17
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 403, 406-07 (1995) (stating that “the statute was not
a proper time, place, or manner restriction.”).
156. Henning Schulzrinne, supra note 24.
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stake must be weighed in order to evaluate the best solution.157 A ban on
fraudulent telemarketing calls—or at the very least “deceptive” types of
calls—may have a genuine justification that would serve millions of
frustrated consumers. However, the Supreme Court has stated “protection
available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of
the expression and of the governmental interests served by its
regulation.”158 Indeed, “while certain regulations short of an outright ban
would certainly be unconstitutional, some regulation of robocalls is
permissible under the First Amendment.”159 Simply because alternatives for
marketing—such as mass mailings or email—are available and
constitutional, however, does not mean that they are ideal: “simple
economics tells us that these firms have found that they can be most
profitable if they disseminate their messages [through telemarketing].”160
Although “more people may be more easily and cheaply reached . . . [this]
is not enough to call forth constitutional protection of what those charged
with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of
publicity are open.”161 While a general prohibition on robocalls might be
unwise,162 a careful analysis of the First Amendment interests at stake in
any additional telemarketing regulation is warranted.163
The Supreme Court first gave protection to commercial speech in
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, holding
that pharmacists did have a right to advertise the prices of their drugs to
consumers.164 Subsequent cases followed this line of reasoning until
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York, which introduced a more concrete test that set forth four
considerations for valid commercial speech:
157. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (weighing the right of the
individual householder to make decisions about listening to solicitors, or whether
the community should make the decisions for or against solicitors).
158. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) (discussing the constitutional protection given to commercial speech).
159. Miller, supra note 49, at 245 (discussing regulations less strict than an outright
ban).
160. Worth, supra note 132, at 476 (stating that “telemarketers use telephonic
communication for a reason.”).
161. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) (discussing enforcing freedom of
speech at the cost of disregarding the rights of others).
162. See Hynes v. Mayor, 425 U.S. 610, 623 (1976) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (stating
laws ‘must encounter substantial First Amendment barriers” and should be
scrutinized).
163. Michael E. Shannon, Note, Combatting Unsolicited Sales Calls: The “Do-NotCall” Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIS. 381, 383
(2001) (stating “[t]he First Amendment interests of the caller must be weighed
against the privacy interests of the consumer.”).
164. Va. Pharm. Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(holding that the government could not suppress truthful information from being
lawfully advertised).
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If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful
activity. . . [t]he State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by
restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique
must be in proportion to that interest. The limitations on expression must
be designed carefully to achieve the state’s goal . . . First, the restriction
must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be
sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the
governments purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served
as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive
restrictions cannot survive.165

1.

Non-misleading commercial speech, not related to unlawful
activity

The Supreme Court stated in Central Hudson that “[t]he First
Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational
function of advertising.” Although there is no strong constitutional basis
for forbidding messages that are inaccurate, the “government may ban
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform
it.”166 All robocalls made by prerecorded dialers may not be explicitly
unlawful, but some calls (like those offering reduced credit card rates or
special insurance offers), may mislead consumers. On these grounds a
more specific ban or additional regulation of robocalls may be justified.

2.

Substantial governmental interest in regulation

The second prong in the Central Hudson test, which addresses whether
the government has a substantial interest in the regulation at stake, further
supports increased regulation. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Supreme
Court found that disclosure of more information, rather than less, served
both the government and consumer interests at stake in the regulation of
alcohol.167 Because the government has a substantial interest in protecting
the health and safety of its citizens, disclosure of more information about

165. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
166. Id. (stating “there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful
activity”). See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978)
(stating “the justifications for prohibiting truthful . . . [advertising] are insufficient
to override . . . the First and Fourteenth Amendments, in assuring the free flow of
commercial information.”); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n,
413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (“On the contrary, we reaffirm unequivocally the
protection afforded to editorial judgment and to the free expression of views on
these and other issues, however controversial.”).
167. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 484 (1995) (“In the
Government’s view, restricting disclosure of information regarding a particular
product characteristic will decrease the extent to which consumers will select the
product on the basis of that characteristic.”).
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the content of the beer was warranted.168 Likewise, since the government
has an interest in protecting its citizens from fraud—while also protecting
small businesses—stricter robocalling regulation could protect the
individuals receiving the calls as well as restore the public’s trust in
legitimate small businesses that may be making genuine sales calls.169

3.

Directly advances the governmental interest

The third element in the Central Hudson test addresses whether the
regulation is “narrowly tailored” to achieve a government interest. This
element does not directly support more regulation as “[t]he State cannot
regulate speech that poses no danger to the asserted state interest.”170
Arguably, fraudulent telemarketing calls pose no direct danger to state
interests, and a complete ban on robocalls would only interfere with the
government’s interests.171 Telemarketing calls are a valuable tool for
companies to reach consumers easily and cheaply; a more explicit ban
would not clearly advance the interest of the government.172 Here, the
proactive Do Not Call registry, a simple mechanism for registry and
reporting, is a remedy more narrowly tailored toward protecting both the
interests of the government and the businesses at stake in the matter. 173

4.

Not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest

Finally, regulation must not be more extensive than necessary to serve
the governmental interest at stake. In Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC,
the Supreme Court held that regulations must not burden more speech than
is necessary to further the government interest they promote.174 This
element does not support broad-based bans. In Central Hudson, for

168. Id. at 488 (“While the laws governing labeling prohibit the disclosure of alcohol
content unless required by state law, federal regulations apply a contrary policy to
beer advertising.”).
169. See Statement of Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
(Feb. 15, 2012) (“At the same time that we help consumers avoid unwanted
robocalls, we do so in a manner that is minimally burdensome to businesses,
including small businesses.”).
170. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 565 (stating “the First Amendment
mandates that speech restrictions be ‘narrowly drawn.).
171. i.e., in notifying residents about emergency situations.
172. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 15 U.S. 618 (1995) (discussing the balance between
the legislature’s ends and the means used to reach them).
173. Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 23 F.C.C.R. § 559
(2003).
174. Turner Broad. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 520 U.S. 180, 213-14 (1997) (stating
“the Government may employ the means of its choosing” as long as the
regulation upholds a substantial governmental interest and only goes as far as is
necessary to promote that interest).
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example, the Court found that as important as the energy-conservation
rationale is, it cannot justify suppressing information.175
Although all of these interests might be fulfilled through telemarketing
regulation, the government might be justified in offering more extensive
telemarketing regulation based on the government’s interest in protecting
the public from “commercial harms.”176 Here, while some telemarketing
calls are fraudulent, other telemarketing calls serve a valuable purpose of
informing customers about valuable deals and promotions. As the
government still has an interest in promoting business, a complete ban on
robocalling would likely be deemed more extensive than necessary to serve
governmental purposes. Although irate recipients of constant robocalls may
think otherwise, “a statute cannot foreclose an entire medium of
expression.”177

IV. CONSIDERATION OF A SAMPLING OF PROPOSED REMEDIES TO
REDUCE ROBOCALLS
Absent a complete ban on robocalls, any effective remedy to reduce
fraudulent robocalls must bridge both the technical and legal gaps in the
market. Although inconsistent regulation may have caused consumers and
telemarketers to think otherwise, certain calls made through the use of
prerecorded voice messages have been illegal for decades.178 But
consumers still receive millions of these calls a year despite multiple forms
of regulation and growing enforcement efforts.179 One proposed solution
illustrates this paradox: absent a complete ban, regulation that treats the Do
Not Call Registry as a digital “no solicitation” sign has also been proposed;
this solution would make it impossible to call a telephone number on the
Do Not Call Registry.180 While not altogether practical since this number
would still need to receive legitimate robocalls, this suggestion impedes
legitimate telemarketer access to numbers on the Do Not Call Registry and
175. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 570 (“But the energy conservation
rationale, as important as it is, cannot justify suppressing information about
electric devices or services that would cause no net increase in total energy use.”).
176. 44 Liquormart v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (explaining why commercial
speech can be subject to more regulation than noncommercial speech); see also
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993) (stating
“preventing commercial harms by regulating the information distributed . . . is, of
course, the typical reason why commercial speech can be subject to greater
governmental regulation than noncommercial speech.”).
177. Miller, supra note 49, at 244; City of Ladue v. Gileo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994).
178. See supra Part II(I).
179. See supra text accompanying note 2 (One robocall firm bragged of calling 10% to
20% of the American population daily).
180. Cox, supra note 156, at 424 (stating “Telemarketing should be banned until the
technology is available to put a “no solicitation” sign on your phone number as
well.”)
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ignores the realities of direct marketing.181 While it may reduce the number
of solicitations made, even physical “no solicitation” signs do not prevent
canvassers from walking up to a door, thus it is unclear that a digital
version would have any true impact on solicitations.
The ideal telemarketing solution must also capitalize on relative
societal norms, taking into account expected consumer and telemarketer
behavior. While an “opt-in” system would be ideal, it would essentially
make the telemarketing system defunct.182 As consumers are not
accustomed to “opting-in” to ideas that may be perceived as harmful or
annoying; the average consumer is far more likely to “opt-out” of such a
scheme. Because “consumers are accustomed to being solicited at home
and virtually everywhere else,”183 opting in to telemarketing calls would
not prevent any more robocalls than the Do Not Call Registry already does.
Additionally, with the addition of the “express written consent” element of
the 2008 FTC revisions and 2012 FCC revisions, an opt-in solution
essentially already exists;184 consumers who give their express written
consent can receive telemarketing calls from that company. This “consent”
can also be manipulated in many ways, however; “express written consent”
can be obtained through obtained by telemarketers through an online form,
credit card signature, or a “terms” agreement on a website.185 Although an
“opt-in” solution may reduce some telemarketing calls, the suggestion is
far from ideal. This proposed solution is most likely to impede free speech
by telemarketers: “when limitations on speech are requested or mandated
by individual listeners rather than the government, the First Amendment
protection afforded to the speaker is less.”186
Another suggested solution would quite literally “capitalize” on
societal norms: a “pay-me-to listen” solution, such as that advocated by
New York Times columnist James B. Rule, “would allow consumers to put
a price tag on their time spent listening to telemarketing calls.”187 This
“low tech” solution would require telephone providers to offer consumers
181. Q&A For Telemarketers & Sellers About DNC Provisions in TSR, BUREAU OF
CONSUMER
PROTECTION
BUSINESS
CENTER,
http://www.business.ftc.gov/documents/alt129-qa-telemarketers-sellers-aboutdnc-provisions-tsr (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
182. See Nelson, supra note 50, at 76 (noting that an opt-in proposal would remedy the
current situation in which all consumers are vulnerable to calls unless they have
affirmatively acted otherwise).
183. Id.
184. See
Telemarketers
and
Robocalls,
FED.
COMMC’NS
COMM’N,
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/telemarketing (last visited Mar. 25, 2014)
(“most recently, in 2012, the FCC revised its TCPA rules to require telemarketers
to obtain prior express written consent from consumers before robocalling them.”
).
185. Supra text accompanying note 124.
186. Worth, supra note 132, at 476.
187. Nelson, supra note 50, at 76.
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the option of only accepting “bonded” calls, or calls that had already been
screened as a valid telemarketing call.188 If the recipient of the call
designates the call a nuisance, then the telemarketer would then be billed
for the call.189 Here, the burden of compliance and expense is placed almost
entirely on the telemarketer, who would have to demonstrate “willingness
and ability to compensate the recipient – should the latter designate the call
a nuisance” before placing any telemarketing calls.190 Although Rule
suggested that this “would require only modest alteration[s] of existing
technology,” he has not “vetted the scheme with a technical expert.”191
Technical considerations aside, the scheme likely would not pass
constitutional muster; paying the consumer to listen to telemarketing calls
would make telemarketing cost-prohibitive for small and fledgling
businesses. This likely impermissibly constrains commercial speech.
Although some consumers may agree to participate in this suggested
scheme as a potential source of income, it is more likely that few
consumers would agree to participate. In order to receive the suggested
compensation for listening to “nuisance” telemarketing calls, the consumer
must agree to listen to the nuisance – a counterintuitive process.192
Clearly, since consumers do not want to listen to robocalls and they
value privacy within their home, the ideal remedy to reduce robocalls
would weigh the value of this privacy against the utility of the solution.
One researcher used data from the Do Not Call Registry in an attempt to
monetize the exact privacy interest at stake, measuring what value a
telemarketer must provide in order to convince a consumer not to join the
Do Not Call Registry.193 This research found that “if the privacy cost is
$8.25 per year (per consumer), then the direct marketing industry must
increase the expected consumer surplus to exceed $8.25 a year in order to
persuade consumers to accept telemarketing and remove themselves from
the do not call registry.”194 Unless enough telemarketers offer legitimate,
non-fraudulent business considerations, “each telemarketer will provide too
188. James B. Rule, Op-Ed., Call Me, Pay Fee, N. Y. TIMES, June 21, 2012, at A25.
This proposal was also submitted to the FTC Robocall Challenge.
189. Id. (stating that “institutional callers that now offend thousands to obtain a
positive response from a tiny majority would be obliged to weigh the effects of
their entreaties on all those whose attendance they commandeer.”).
190. Id.
191. Jeffries, supra note 9.
192. Nelson, supra note 50, at 77 (noting that although this proposal would allow only
those telemarketers willing to pay the consumer’s price to speak to them, it is
unlikely to be successful as there is little indication of consumers being interested
in participation).
193. Ivan P.L. Png, On the Value of Privacy from Telemarketing: Evidence from the
‘Do Not Call’ Registry 3 (2007) (unpublished manuscript) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1000533) (using econometric
methods to estimate the value of state and federal do not call registries).
194. Id.
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little benefit to consumers, and hence, the number of consumers who
accept telemarketing will fall short of the social optimum.”195 Regardless of
the $8.25 in “privacy costs,” however, the ultimate interests at stake are
much harder to calculate as “there is the . . . cost of having one’s personal
space invaded by a robocaller that one never wished to summon.196
When the FTC announced its “Robocall Challenge” on October 18,
2012, the FTC stepped outside of its rulemaking power to advocate for a
“crowd-sourced” solution to robocalling.197 Offering $50,000 for a
technical solution to reduce robocalls, the Robocall Summit expressed the
first perspective from an agency that a solution to end robocalling must be
a combination of technical, legal, and practical remedies. The FTC is
certainly not the first agency to advocate for a crowd-sourced solution to a
public policy problem and offer money for the solution;198 however, many
crowd-sourced solutions often fall flat.199 With the challenge, the FTC
recognizes the ways in which the Do Not Call Registry is limited: “The
companies that use this technology don’t bother to screen for numbers on
the Do Not Call Registry. If the company doesn’t care about obeying the
law, you can be sure they’re trying to scam you.”200 At the summit, the
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection Director David Vladeck stated, “we
think this will be an effective approach in the case of robocalls because the
winner of our challenge will become a national hero.”201 A “national hero”
is certainly what is needed: because of the call spoofing, inefficient
tracking mechanisms, and the sheer number of robocalls, the FTC has
consistently had trouble tracking these callers.202 An ideal solution would
require telephone providers and government regulators to work together.
However, “[t]he legacy infrastructure of the public switch telephone
195. Id. at 7 (concluding, ultimately, that “[e]ach telemarketer will provide too little
benefit to consumers, and hence, the number of consumers who accept
telemarketing will fall short of the social optimum.”).
196. Randall Stross, Robocalls Instigate a Cellphone Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2011, at BU3.
197. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Challenges Innovators to Do Battle with
Robocallers (Oct. 18, 2012).
198. Miller, supra note 37 (stating that the government currently has 237 open public
challenges, as of January 23, 2013).
199. Jeffries, supra note 9 (giving the example of a Netflix challenge that encouraged
consumers to create an ideal algorithm to create the video suggestions for
consumers).
200. Robocalls,
FED.
TRADE
COMM’N
(July
2012),
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0259-robocalls (discussing how technology
allows companies to make thousands of automated calls per minute at negligible
costs, which explains the spike in robocalls).
201. Sperry, supra note 21 (describing the FTC Robocall Challenge).
202. See Schulzrinne, supra note 24 (explaining how automation has been on the side
of companies that perpetrate robocalls, and how the means currently employed by
law enforcement are not adequate to match what robocallers use).
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network, and the fact that carriers and government must coordinate, make”
cooperation extremely difficult.203 But with the Robocall Challenge, a
solution that helps telephone service providers, telemarketers, and the
government work together to reduce robocalls, such coordination may be
successful.
In addition to any technical solution, an ideal remedy to reduce
robocalls would also include streamlined enforcement methods. The
enforcement methods the FTC currently employs are slow and
cumbersome. While robocall telemarketers may be international operations
with automated computer and numbering systems in multiple locations,204
the FTC must fax its efforts to enforce robocall regulations via subpoenas
and injunctions one document at a time, slowly moving through
complicated manual trace back methods.205 Unlike email spam enforcement
efforts - which could possibly be traced back to one IP address or
encrypted metadata – it is much harder to track spoofed phone numbers.206
The FTC has brought over 100 enforcement actions against telemarketing
in the ten years since the Do Not Call Registry went into effect,207 but many
more enforcement actions could come to fruition if the FTC has an efficient
method to track fraudulent numbers. These cases have resulted in $6.9
million in penalties,208 but this number pales in comparison to the 3.84
million robocall complaints, 2.26 million of which included recorded
messages.209 Although an “opt-in” or “pay me to listen” solution is unlikely
to stand up to constitutional challenges or technical realities, the FTC’s
Robocall Challenge, paired with additional regulation, has potential.

V. PROPOSED REMEDIES TO REDUCE ROBOCALLS AND
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Inconsistent and duplicative regulations, First Amendment
considerations, slow methods of enforcement, and the complicated nature
of proposed solutions prove that any remedy to reduce robocalls must
include a multi-layered combination of legal and technical remedies in
order to stop the constant invasion of “Rachel” and “Ann” into America’s
203. Jeffries, supra note 9 (arguing that technology gives robocallers a net advantage
over law enforcement). http://www.theverge.com/2013/1/28/3924544/who-canstop-robocalls-ftcs-attempt-to-crowdsource-a-solution-falls
204. Supra Part I.
205. See Schulzrinne, supra note 24 (referring to the laborious and often inefficient
process law enforcement employs when trying to trace back robocalls).
206. Id. (explaining why, despite the ease with which we can block email spam today,
applying similar processes to phone calls is very difficult or even impossible).
207. Jeffries, supra note 9 (discussing why the Robocall Challenge was unsuccessful
in providing the FTC with a solution to stop robocalls).
208. Id.
209. Miller, supra note 37 (discussing the Robocall Challenge).
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homes. At best, theses remedies would reflect the purpose of the TCPA,
recognizing that “individuals’ privacy rights, public safety interests, and
commercial freedoms of speech and trade must be balanced in a way that
protects the privacy of individuals and permits legitimate telemarketing
practices.”210 The Robocall Challenge aims to search out a technical
solution to reduce robocalls; the ideal solution, however, needs to be a
technical solution that involves cooperation between telephone service
providers and the government, easy reporting methods for consumers who
receive consistent robocalls, and a streamlined statutory and regulatory
structure that enables clear easy-to-understand preventative measures and
enforcement of violations. Ideally, a multi-faceted approach would
anticipate changes in technology so that consumers are at peace from
“Rachel” for years to come.

A.

Unified Federal Telemarketing Rulemaking Structure

This Note advocates a moratorium on additional rulemaking by both
the FTC and FCC until Congress takes action to give sole authority for
telemarketing regulation to one agency. This act should focus first on
transparency.211 With duplicative regulation coming from the TCPA and
the TCFAPA, which addressed many of the same topics within a five-year
span, transparency in telemarketing regulation has not been present since
the early 1990s. Although at the beginning, the Do Not Call Registry aimed
to maximize consistency, the duplicative and complicated rulemaking
procedures that the FTC and FCC used throughout the early 2000s have
only led to more confusion among consumers, the media, and
telemarketing companies. In effect, by taking action to create a new and
transparent telemarketing act, Congress would essentially be following its
own demand in regards to consistencies. When Congress revised the
TCFAPA in 2003, it called for the FTC and the FCC to issue new
regulations and stated that Congress should enact legislation that will offer
consumers necessary protection from telemarketing deception and
abuse.”212 FCC Commissioner Clyburn spoke to this reactive nature of
regulation in 2012: although she wrote that the FCC was “carrying out
Congress’ intent to ensure that the FCC’s rules regarding telemarketing
‘robocalls’ are harmonized with those of the Federal Trade
Commission.”213 Clyburn also noted that “[t]his effort makes additional

210. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 02-278, IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
1991, at 20 (June 26, 2003) (explaining the objectives of the order).
211. Miller, supra note 49, at 248.
212. See Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §
6101 (2006) (outlining the three ways Congress intended to create more effective
regulation in this field).
213. Robert McDowell, Statement Regarding Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-12-21A3.pdf.
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good sense because . . . Congress told us to do it!”214 After such
inconclusive regulations, constant revisions, and confusing standards, a
concrete national standard for prohibiting deceptive telemarketing–one that
would preempt state regulations–is the best legal remedy to combat
robocalls. Otherwise, the patchwork regulation among the states and the
two federal agencies makes legal compliance difficult as a unified standard
would make enforcement of robocalls easier.215
Because the FTC currently administers the Do Not Call Registry, leads
enforcement actions, and introduced the Robocall Challenge, the FTC is
the best-equipped agency to hold rulemaking power over telemarketing. As
evidenced by the FTC’s enforcement actions targeting illegitimate,
fraudulent telemarketers,216 any act that delegates sole rulemaking power to
the FTC must prohibit deceptive telemarketing calls. While not a complete
ban, an act that forbids fraudulent calls would pass constitutional muster
and appropriately balance the interests of businesses and consumers. While
opponents may argue that an exemption for calls from “legitimate”
companies is illegally based on content, other similar restrictions, such as
the exemptions for political robocalls and calls for charitable solicitations
are constitutional.217 Because the “government may ban forms of
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it,”218 a
prohibition against deceptive callers that exempts legitimate companies
also holds up under the Central Hudson test.219 As FTC and FCC
statements show, the government has a direct interest in reducing
fraudulent telemarketing though regulation and enforcement. Because an
act that would delegate rulemaking authority to the FTC alone would ban
fraudulent robocalls–not all robocalls–it would also be narrowly tailored
and not more extensive than necessary to serve the interests of the
government, consumers, and the businesses at stake. While the act might
hurt the efforts of telemarketers intending to defraud consumers, it would
reduce the number of robocalls that reach consumers while still enabling
small businesses to place legitimate robocalls. Ideally, such a targeted act
would create both a “victory for consumers” and a “win for industry.”220
An act that bans deceptive robocallers would end regulatory uncertainty,
214. Id.
215. See Miller, supra note 49, at 247 (arguing that “such inconsistencies make it
difficult, if not impossible, for political candidates to be aware of them all.”).
216. As opposed to legitimate telemarketing companies.
217. See id. at 246 (indicating that in regards to politics, restrictions on robocalls
cannot “suppress legitimate speech and access to informative robocalls.”).
218. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 164-174 (applying the four-part Central
Hudson test).
220. See Clyburn, supra note 150 (“The Order before us today is yet another victory
for consumers . . . This Order is also a win for industry.”).
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streamline enforcement actions, and reduce consumer and business
confusion that ultimately contributes to the rise in robocalls.

B.

Do Not Call Registry Reevaluation and Consumer Education

There are other practical solutions that do not require an act of
Congress. Specifically, the utility of the Do Not Call list needs to be reevaluated regarding its utility in combatting fraudulent telemarketing calls.
At ten years in existence, the use of the registry has helped decrease the
number of telemarketing calls from legitimate companies: “consumer
surveys show that consumers perceive that the Registry has been very
effective in reducing unwanted telemarketing calls, it is also true that
consumers who have listed their telephone numbers on the Registry
continue to get unwelcome, unsolicited calls.”221 Consumers report general
familiarity with the Registry: an October 2007 poll “reported that 86% of
survey participants were familiar with the Registry, and 72% reported that
they had registered their telephone numbers.”222
Although general familiarity with the registry exists, many consumers
are confused about what to do when they receive a robocall. In this regard,
the Do Not Call Registry’s ease of use cannot be topped by any other
remedy. As a fully automated system that can be completed quickly and
easily, the Registry currently provides two ways to register a complaint: an
interactive voice response system accessed by a toll-free telephone number
and an internet-based system.223 The FTC has instigated a number of
targeted education campaigns to educate consumers about the utility of the
Do Not Call Registry;224 as the Registry reaches a decade in age, additional
educational campaigns are warranted. Even if robocalls cannot be reduced
in any other way, more educated consumers that report fraudulent robocalls
(even if reported numbers end up being spoofed) may bolster the FTC’s
enforcement efforts and ultimately reduce robocalls. Even this little effort
could reduce robocalls; because “the FTC believes that the robocall
industry has very low margins . . . even small steps toward decreasing the
effectiveness of robocalls or driving up their costs could wipe out the
market.”225

221. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 85, at 12.
222. Id. at 4.
223. Do-Not-Call Improvement Act of 2007 Report to Congress: Regarding the
Accuracy of the Do Not Call Registry, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1-2 (2008), available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/do-not-callimprovement-act-2007-report-congress-regarding-accuracy-do-not-callregistry/p034305dncreport.pdf (stating that the entire process “takes only a few
minutes and requires consumers to provide minimal personally identifiable
information.”).
224. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 85, at 4-6 (discussing a program targeting
senior citizens and immigrant communities).
225. Jeffries, supra note 9.
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C.

Balanced Assessment of Robocall Challenge Solution

If the FTC choses a technical solution from the Robocall Challenge to
reduce robocalling, that solution must join seamlessly with the Do Not Call
Registry and existing telemarketing regulations. Initial reviews of the
proposals are not optimistic. While the challenge received many valid
submissions, “most of the actual submissions fell short of genius[, and] . . .
[t]he submission gallery is littered with half serious proposals . . . as well as
incoherent ramblings . . . and dubious claims . . . Many proposals are
lacking in details and riddled with typos.”226 The most common submission
was to simply dial a number to report the call, “which the FTC is
considering–it just requires cooperation from carriers who would have to
agree to a single standard, then agree to a mechanism for transferring the
data to the government.”227 Ultimately, the best solution is “going to take
time, negotiation with carriers, and infrastructure changes.”228 Whatever
solution is chosen from the robocall challenge, the ideal solution must
adapt to changing technology; in five or ten years, telemarketing might be
phased out by another direct-to-phone marketing technique. While
telemarketing may take place over landline telephones today, “Rachel” and
“Ann” may soon invade other forms of communication; essentially, there is
“a move towards that Facebookian world where a message is a message is
a message and there is no differentiation between lengths and genres,
platforms and devices.”229
The FTC announced two winners to the Robocall Challenge in April
2013, after the agency received nearly 800 submissions. Both of the
proposals by the winning individuals, Serder Danis and Aaron Foss,230
“focus on intercepting and filtering out illegal prerecorded calls using
technology to ‘blacklist’ robocaller phone numbers and ‘whitelist’ numbers
associated with acceptable incoming calls.”231 Foss’s proposed solution is
called Nomorobo.232 The free service is a cloud-based mechanism that uses
“simultaneous ringing” to allow analysis of the frequency of incoming calls
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Alexis C. Madrigal, Credit Where It’s Due, I Love the New Gmail Design, THE
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
1,
2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/11/credit-where-its-due-ilove-the-new-gmail-design/264416/.
230. FTC Announces Robocall Challenge Winners, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 2,
2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/04/ftc-announcesrobocall-challenge-winners. Danis’s system is called ‘The Robocall Filtering
System and Device with Autonomous Blacklisting, Whitelisting, Graylisting and
Caller ID Spoof Detection.’
231. Id.
232. Id. (stating that Nomorobo is “a cloud-based solution that would use
‘simultaneous ringing,’ which allows incoming calls to be routed to a second
telephone line.”).
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and appropriate blocking of offending numbers.233 Details about privacy
concerns, intellectual property issues are yet to be fleshed out. However,
Charles Harwood, acting director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer
Protection, stated that “[t]he solutions that our winners came up with have
the potential to turn the tide on illegal robocalls.”234 Ultimately, these
technical robocall solutions will be integrated into the four prongs of the
FTC’s robocall action plan: 1) continuing law enforcement aggressively; 2)
gathering evidence strategically; 3) holding summits with law enforcement,
industry members, and other stakeholders; and 4) pursuing other
technological solutions.235 The pursuit of these goals, along with the
technical solutions developed through the Robocall Challenge, represent a
step in the right direction to reduce robocalls.

CONCLUSION
Consumers may continue to receive calls from “Rachel” in the
immediate future, but realistic remedies exist to reduce and regulate
robocalls. Although duplicative and inconsistent regulation have
contributed to confusion and inefficient federal telemarketing policy, a
unified and concrete regulatory approach that supports the First
Amendment rights of both the consumer and the marketer and is backed by
targeted enforcement efforts and proactive preventative technical remedies
will help to reduce robocalls. While commercial telemarketing calls may be
the bane of some families’ existences, thoughtful remedies that reduce the
number of these calls will ultimately protect consumers’ right to peace and
quiet.

233. Jennifer Waters, Many Robocalls Are Scams, WALL St. J. (Aug. 24, 2013, 8:44
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732366550457902851077252525
6.html (estimating the release date as mid-September 2013).
234. Edward Wyatt, 2 Deterrents to Robocalls Win Contest By F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 2013, at B4.
235. Robocall
Action
Plan,
FED.
TRADE
COMM’N,
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0367-robocall-action-plan (last visited Mar.
25, 2014) (summarizing the FTC’s 4-part plan).
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